Lafayette, we are here!
With German submarines sending the ships of neutral nations to the ocean’s floor and the loss of American lives mounting, Congress declared war on Germany on April 2, 1917. The war-weary French welcomed the first American troops two months later and on July 4th the U.S. 16th Infantry made a symbolic march through Paris. The parade ended in Picpus Cemetery at the tomb of the Marquis de Lafayette. Lafayette had served with distinction in George Washington’s Continental Army, leaving for a time to return to France and negotiate an increase in support for the American cause. Speaking at Lafayette’s tomb, Colonel Charles Stanton concluded his remarks by proclaiming, “Lafayette, we are here!”
America’s entry into World War I marked a turning point for the longstanding American tradition of isolationism, the reluctance to become involved in European alliances and wars. Protected by two oceans for a hundred years, Americans had been able to engage the Old World through commerce and diplomacy rather than warfare. With the end of the war in 1918, many hoped to once more retreat into isolation. Those hopes were dashed at Pearl Harbor.
The United States emerged from World War II with security concerns that encompassed safeguarding democratic government and protecting free trade around the world in order to provide the American economy with markets and raw materials. A parade of technologies from submarines to ICBMs had made isolation an ineffective tool for the pursuit of these goals.
Isolationism seemed a dead letter in serious discussions of American foreign policy until Donald Trump brought his fascination with Russia and dislike of NATO to the White House. Formed after World War II as an alliance of the U.S., Canada and European democracies to keep the peace in Europe and act as a bulwark against Russian aggression, NATO has evolved into an instrument through which the American government works with allies on military matters around the world.
NATO’s core principal is the collective-defense provision, known as Article V, that states that an armed attack on any member “shall be considered an attack against them all.” Mr. Trump never believed in such mutual defense obligations, writing in 2000 that “pulling back from Europe would save this country millions of dollars annually.” John Bolton, the former President’s national security adviser, wrote in his memoir that Trump had to be repeatedly talked out of withdrawing from NATO.
This past weekend the former President took his animus to a new level, declaring at a rally in South Carolina that not only would he not defend NATO countries that he views as not spending enough on defense, but that he would go so far as to “encourage” Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” against them. Never before has a President suggested that he would incite an enemy to attack American allies.
America’s alliances are vitally important. Our standard of living directly depends on a world economy governed by a set of rules concerning the movement and exchange of goods, the right to travel, and relations between nations. Those rules were largely worked out between the U.S. and Europeans. In a world operating under Russian or Chinese rules, American activities would be at the sufferance of countries that do not mean us well.
Long averse to alliances of any kind and no longer surrounded by the kind of advisers who dissuaded him from extreme actions in the past, Mr. Trump in a second term could effectively end the security umbrella that has guarded friends in Europe, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East for the eight decades since the end of World War II. Just the suggestion that the United States could not be depended on might prompt longtime friends to back away and embolden the likes of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.
Our allies are a great strength. Russia and China have nothing to compare with them. But these allies depend on our continuing commitment. If we are no longer here for Lafayette, Lafayette may not be here for us.